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Abstract
Stable generated models for extended generalized logic programs with two kinds of nega-
tion provide a semantics for logic programming in its (up to now) most general form. We show
that stable generated semantics for extended logic programs coincides with the semantics ob-
tained by translating programs into a minimal partial temporal logic. Then we introduce sev-
eral new versions of (disjunctive) default logic and show that there are strong (semantical)
connections between default logic and logic programming with stable generated mod-
els. Ó 1999 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Logic programming; Default logic; Partial temporal logic; Stable generated
semantics; Disjunctive defaults
1. Introduction
In knowledge representation, two dierent notions of falsity arise in a natural
way. Certain facts are implicitly false by default by not being verified in any intended
model of the knowledge base. Others are explicitly false by virtue of a direct proof of
their falsity, corresponding to their falsification in all intended models. These two
kinds of falsity in knowledge representation are captured by the two negations,
called weak and strong, of partial logic [9]. We use partial logic with two kinds of
negation as the basis for building declarative semantics for logic programs. Logic
programs can be viewed as knowledge bases consisting of facts and rules. While facts
express extensional knowledge, rules express intensional knowledge. Logic programs
should be as easy to write and comprehend as possible and as close to natural
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discourse as possible. Standard logic programs are not suciently expressive for a
comprehensible representation of large classes of knowledge bases and informal de-
scriptions. Formalisms admitting more complex formulas, as extended logic pro-
grams, are more expressive and natural to use since they permit in many cases
easier translation from natural language expressions and from informal specifica-
tions. The expressive power of extended generalized logic programs also simplifies
the problem of translation of non-monotonic formalisms into logic programs.
A set of facts can be viewed, in its most simple form, as a database whose seman-
tics is determined by its minimal models. In the case of logic programs, minimal
models are not adequate because they are not able to capture ‘groundedness’, i.e.,
the directedness of rules. Therefore, stable models in the form of certain fixpoints
have been proposed by Gelfond and Lifschitz [5] as the intended models of normal
logic programs. In Ref. [11], this notion was generalized to the class of generalized
logic programs by presenting a definition which is neither fixpoint-based nor depen-
dent on any specific rule syntax. In the present paper we relate this definition to the
minimal models of systems of temporal partial logic. Furthermore, we investigate the
relation between stable generated models and (disjunctive) default logic. A prelimi-
nary version of this paper appeared in Ref. [1].
The paper has the following structure. After introducing some basic notation in
Section 2, we recall the notion of a stable generated model in Section 3. Sec-
tions 4–6 describe the partial temporal logic and its link with stable generated mod-
els. In Sections 7 and 8 we introduce the notion of a generated extension
of a disjunctive default theory and investigate the connections with stable generated
models.
2. Preliminaries
A signature r  hRel; ExRel; Const; Funi consists of a set of relation symbols
Rel, a set of exact relation symbols ExRel  Rel, a set of constant symbols Const,
and a set of function symbols Fun. If Rel  ExRel we say that the signature is
classical. Ur denotes the set of all ground terms of r. For a tuple t1; . . . ; tn we will
also write~t when its length is of no relevance. The logical functors are ÿ;;:;^;
_;; 8; 9, where ÿ; , and : are called weak, strong negation and classical negation
and  is called material implication. The language of partial logic Lr is the smallest
set containing the atomic formulas of r, and being closed with respect to the follow-
ing conditions: if F ;G 2 Lr, then fÿF ; F ; F ^ G; F _ G; F  G; 9xF ; 8xF g 
Lr. The language over a classical signature r of classical logic is denoted by
Lcr; it is the smallest set containing the atomic formulas over r, and being closed
with respect to the following condition: if F ;G 2 Lcr, then f:F ; F ^ G; F _ G; F 
G; 9xF ; 8xF g  Lcr. signX  denotes the set of relational and functional symbols,
and constants occurring in the formulas of X.
L0r (and analogous L0cr) denotes the corresponding set of sentences (closed
formulas). For sublanguages of Lr formed by means of a subset F of the logical
functors, we write Lr;F. With respect to a signature r we define the following
sublanguages: Atr  Lr; ;, the set of all atomic formulas (also called atoms);
Litr  Atr [ f a: a 2 Atrg, the set of all literals, and XLitr  Litr[
fÿl: l 2 Litrg, the set of all extended literals. We introduce the following conven-
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tions. When L  Lr is some sublanguage, L0 denotes the corresponding set of sen-
tences. If the signature r does not matter, we omit it and write, e.g., L instead of Lr.
QF r  L0r;ÿ;;_;^; denotes the set of all quantifier free sentences over the
signature r. If hY ; <i is a partial order, then MinY ; < denotes the set of all minimal
elements of Y , i.e., MinY ; <  fx 2 Y j there is no x0 2 Y such that x0 < xg. 2X de-
notes the power set of the set X .
Let r  hRel; ExRel; Const; Funi be a signature. A Herbrand r-interpretat-
ion of Lr is set of literals I  Lit0r. Its universe or domain is equal to
the set of all ground terms Ur; its canonical interpretation of ground terms
is the identity mapping. An interpretation I assigns two relations rI and ~rI ,
which can be viewed as the truth and falsity extension, to every relation sym-
bol r 2 Rel: r I  f~t 2 Uarr : r~t  2 Ig, and ~r I  f~t 2 Uarr : r~t  2 Ig, where ar
denotes the arity of r, such that for all exact predicates r 2 ExRel;
rI [ ~r I  Uarr . Herbrand interpretations of Lr are called partial interpretat-
ions. A Herbrand interpretation of Lcr is a subset of At0r, and it is
called a positive interpretation.
The class of all partial Herbrand r-interpretations is denoted by IH4 r  2Lit
0r,
while the subclass of all coherent Herbrand r-interpretations can be represented as
IHc r  fI 2 2Lit
0r: if a 2 I ; then  a 62 Ig
In the sequel we shall simply say ‘interpretation’ instead of ‘partial Herbrand inter-
pretation’. An instantiation is a function m : Var ! Ur, which can be naturally
extended to arbitrary terms by setting mf t1; . . . ; tn  f mt1; . . . ; mtn. Analo-
gously, an instantiation m can be canonically extended to arbitrary formulas F , where
we write F m instead of mF . Note that for a constant c, being a 0-ary function, we
have mc  c. We will now define the model relation  IH4 r  L0r between
an interpretation and a sentence.
Definition 1 (Model Relation). Let I 2 IH4 r.
1. For literals l 2 Lit0r, I  l i l 2 I .
2. I  F ^ G i I  F and I  G.
3. I  F _ G i I  F or I  G.
4. I  9xF x i I  F t for some t 2 Ur.
5. I  8xF x i I  F t for all t 2 Ur.
6. I  ÿF i I = F .
7. I   F ^ G i I   F_  G.
8. I   F _ G i I   F^  G.
9. I   9xF x i I  8x  F x.
10. I   8xF x i I  9x  F x.
11. I   F i I  F .
12. I   ÿF i I  F .
For formulas F , define I  F i for every instantiation m it holds that I  F m. An in-
terpretation I is a model for a set X of formulas if for every formula F 2 X the con-
dition I  F is satisfied.
We obtain the model operator ModcX   fI 2 IHc : Xg, and the corresponding
consequence relation defined by X c F i ModcX  ModcF . Furthermore, de-
note C0X   fF jX c F and F does not contain weak negationg, and let Modmc
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X  MinModcX ;. If strong negation does not appear in the language we
omit the subscript ‘c’.
A program consists of rules that allow us to generate new knowledge from the
knowledge we already have (facts). Program rules are represented in the following
by sequents.
Definition 2 (Sequent). A sequent s is an expression of the form
F1; . . . ; Fm ) G1; . . . ;Gn
where Fi;Gj 2 Lr for i  1; . . . ;m and j  1; . . . ; n. The body of s, denoted by Bs, is
given by fF1; . . . ; Fmg, and the head of s, denoted by Hs, is given by fG1; . . . ;Gng.
Seqr denotes the class of all sequents s such that Hs;Bs  Lr, and for a given
set S  Seqr, S denotes the set of all ground instances of sequents from S.
For a sequent ) F with empty body we also write more simply F .
Definition 3 (Satisfaction Set).
1. Let I 2 IH4 r, and F 2 Lr. Then SatIF   fm: Var ! Ur j I  F mg.
2. Two formulas F and G from Lr are logically equivalent, denoted by F  G i
SatIF   SatIG for all I 2 IH4 r.
Let I 2 IH4 and let s be the sequent F1; . . . ; Fm ) G1; . . . ;Gn. Then, I  F1; . . . ; Fm
) G1; . . . ;Gn iff
T
i6m SatIFi 
S
j6 n SatIGj. This means that for any valua-
tion for which all of the formulas on the left hand side are true, there must be at
least one of the formulas on the right hand side true. If I  s then I is a model of
s. I is said to be a model of a set X of sequents if for all s 2 X the condition I  s
holds.
We define the following classes of sequents:
1. EDLPr  fs 2 SeqrjHs  Litr;Bs  XLitr;Hs 6 ;g.
2. EGLPr  fs 2 SeqrjHs;Bs  Lr;ÿ;;^;_;g.
3. GLPr  fs 2 SeqrjBs;Hs  Lr;ÿ;^;_;g.
4. SLPr  fs 2 SeqrjBs  Atr [ fÿKjK 2 Lr;^g;
Hs  Atr;Hs 6 ;g.
The class EDLP corresponds to extended disjunctive logic programs, the subsets
of EGLP represent the extended generalized logic programs containing the class of
generalized logic programs which are based on GLP. Subsets of SLP are called super
logic programs and were introduced in Ref. [16]. Furthermore, ENLP (the set of nor-
mal extended rules) denotes the set of all rules from EDLP with exactly one literal in
the head; NLP (the set of all normal rules) collects all rules from ENLP without
strong negation, and finally, DLP is defined as the set of rules from EDLP without
strong negation.
For S  EGLPr, we define the model operator
ModcS  fI 2 IHc r: I  s; for all s 2 Sg
and the associated entailment relation
S c F iff ModcS ModcF 
where F 2 Lr.
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In the sequel we assume that all considered interpretations are coherent (or some-
times positive). Coherent entailment (c) satisfies the following property.
Proposition 1 (Coherence Principles). Let X be a set of formulas from Lr, and F a
r-sentence. Then X c F implies X c ÿF , and X c F implies X  ÿ  F .
With respect to a class of interpretations K , we write K  F i I  F for all I 2 K .
A ground sequent s is applicable in a class of interpretations K if K  Bs. We denote
the set of all ground sequents from a sequent set S which are applicable in K by
SK  fs 2 S: K  Bsg:
In this definition, S is the Herbrand instantiation of S. So SK collects all ground
instances of sequents in S which are applicable in K .
Observation 1. Let S  EGLP be an extended generalized logic program. Then
ModcS ModcS:
A semantics for sequents is given by a preferred model operator U : 2Seq ! 2IHc ,
satisfying the condition US ModcS, and defining the preferential entailment
relation
S U F iff US ModcF :
Abstract expressiveness 2 of languages can be defined as follows.
Definition 4 (Abstract Expressiveness). Let U be a preferred model operator defined
for a language L and let L1 and L2 be sublanguages of L. L2 is said to be at least as
expressive as L1 with respect to U, denoted by L1 6 U L2, if and only if for every finite
subset P  L1 there is a finite subset Q  L2 such that UP  UQ and
signP   signQ. The languages L1; L2 are U-equivalent, denoted by L1 U L2, if
and only if L16 U L2 and L26 U L1.
There are other versions of this notion: we may assume that for every set P the set
Q is computable (taking into considerations complexity measures), we may drop the
condition signP   signQ or the finiteness assumption on P and Q.
Observation 2.
1. ENLP Modmc EDLP
2. NLP Modm DLP
Proof. Obviously, every rule L1; . . . ; Lm ) K1; . . . Kn 2 EDLP can be transformed to a
logical equivalent rule r 2 ENLP by iterated application of the following sound
derivation rule: L1; . . . ; Lm ) K1; . . . ;Kn = L1; . . . ; Lm;ÿK1 ) K2; . . . ;Kn. Further-
more, ModcX  ModcY  implies Modmc X  Modmc Y , X ; Y  EDLP. 
2 This concept does not capture the (somewhat vague) idea of comprehensional expressivity which is
related to the easy representation of meaning.
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Partial logics with two kinds of negations can be used to find adequate represen-
tations of certain meanings occuring in natural language. Such examples appear in
legislation. Consider the following section from ‘The British Nationality Act 1981’:
(2) A new-born infant who, after commencement, is found abandoned in the United
Kingdom shall require British citizenship by section 1.2 if it is not shown that it is not
the case that the person is born. . .
Obviously, formulations of the form ‘it is not shown that it is not the case that Q’
can be expressed by ‘ÿ  Q’.
3. Stable generated models
We consider a model of a set S of sequents as intended if it can be generated bot-
tom-up starting from zero information by an iterated application of the sequents
s 2 S. This intention is captured by the notion of a stable generated model. The sub-
sequent definition is a generalization of the notion discussed in Ref. [11]. This notion
generalizes the answer set semantics of Refs. [6,7] and was investigated in Ref. [12].
In the sequel, we use the notion of an ‘interval’ of interpretations: for M1;M2 2 IHc ,
define M1;M2  fM 2 IHc : M1  M  M2g.
Definition 5 (Stable Generated Model ). Let S  EGLPr. M 2ModcS is called a
stable generated model of S, symbolically M 2ModscS, if there is a monotone (pos-
sibly transfinite) sequence of coherent Herbrand interpretations I0      Ij such
that M  Ij, and
1. I0  ;.
2. For successor ordinals a with 0 < a6j, Ia is a minimal extension of Iaÿ1 satisfy-
ing the heads of all sequents whose bodies hold in Iaÿ1;M , i.e.,
Ia 2Min fI 2 IHc r: I  Iaÿ1; and I 
_
Hs; for all s 2 SIaÿ1;M g;
 
:
3. For limit ordinals k6 j, Ik 
S
a<k Ia.
We also say that M is generated by the S-stable chain I0      Ij.
The stable entailment relation is defined as follows:
S sc F iff ModscS ModcF 
where F 2 Lr.
Claim 1 [11]. For every stable generated model, there is a stable chain of length x gen-
erating it.
In Ref. [11] it was shown that stable generated models of disjunctive programs are
not always minimal and that there are stable generated models which are also
minimal models, but which are not answer sets (see Ref. [6]).
Claim 2 [11]. In the case of (non-disjunctive) extended logic programs, stable generated
models agree with answer sets as defined in Ref. [6].
For disjunctive programs, this is not the case.
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Example 1. Let S  f) a; b; a) b;ÿa) ag. We show that fa; bg is a stable gener-
ated model of S by giving a stable chain for it. I0  ;, S;;fa;bg  f) a; bg. A minimal
extension of ; is either fag or fbg. Take I1  fag. Then Sfag;fa;bg  fa) b;) a; bg,
and a minimal extension of fag satisfying b gives finally I2  fa; bg. On the other
hand, fa; bg is not a minimal model of the Gelfond–Lifschitz reduct of S with respect
to fa; bg, which is f) a; b; a) bg, since fbg is a model of it. In fact, S has no answer
sets.
The following example shows how problems can be represented in our frame-
work.
Example 2 (Climbers and Skiers). The following disjunctive program (inspired by a
similar, but monotonic problem in Ref. [19]) is denoted by P .
Tony, Mike, and John are members of an alpine club. Tony likes rain and John
dislikes snow
(1) mT ;mM;mJ; lT ; r; lJ ; s.
All club members are skiers or climbers:
(2) mx ) clx _ skx.
Climbers normally dislike rain and snow:
(3a) ÿlx; r; clx )  lx; r.
(3b) ÿlx; s; clx )  lx; s.
Skiers like snow and dislike rain:
(4) skx ) lx; s^  lx; r.
Problem. Is there a climber in the club who likes rain but dislikes snow? There is
a positive solution on the basis of the consequence relation sc. Every stable
generated model of P contains the facts clT  and  lT ; s. Hence, P sc clT ^ 
T ; s ^ lT ; r, and Tom satisfies the desired condition. Note that P = c  lT ; s, be-
cause there is a coherent model of P containing the fact lT ; s. Furthermore, there is
no positive solution of this problem using the consequence relation c, i.e.,
P = c9xclx^  lx; s ^ lx; r. 3
We will now briefly describe some results on normal forms for logic programs, to
be used later in Sections 5 and 6. Two programs P and Q are said to be stable
equivalent, denoted by P st Q, if P and Q have the same stable generated models.
A rule s 2 EGLP is in normal form if s  F1; . . . ; Fm ) G1; . . . ;Gn, where every Fi
is a disjunction of extended literals, and every Gj is an extended literal. The rule s
is in special normal form if it is in normal form and every Fi is a extended literal.
A program is in (special) normal form if all of its sequents are. Let SNF EGLP (re-
spectively NF EGLP) be the set of all rules from EGLP in special normal form (re-
spectively in normal form). The sets SNF GLP and NF GLP are defined
analogously. Let FinSeq  fX : X  Seq and X is finiteg.
Definition 6 (Transformation Rule). A relation r  FinSeq  FinSeq is said to be an
admissible transformation rule if r is decidable and for every program P  EGLP,
3 A detailed analysis of this problem is given in Ref. [10].
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and X ; Y 2 FinSeq such that rX ; Y , the condition P st P ÿ X  [ Y is satisfied.
Let R  fr1; . . . ; rmg be a finite set of admissible transformation rules. The relation
!R between programs is defined as follows: P !R Q i there is a rule r 2 R,
Y  P , X ; Y 2 FinSeq such that rX ; Y  and Q  P ÿ X  [ Y . Let !HR be the tran-
sitive closure of !R. P can be transformed into Q by the rule system R if P !HR Q.
Lemma 4. Let P  EGLP, and s 2 P , F  VBs, and G  WHs. Then P st P ÿ fsg
[fBs) Gg st P ÿ fsg [ fF ) Hsg.
Proof. Let Q : P ÿ fsg [ fBs) Gg; we show that P st Q. Let I be a stable gen-
erated model of P and Inn<j, j6x, a stable chain for I . It is sucient to show that
In1 is a minimal model of Hd  In [ f
W
Hr: r 2 QIn;I g. It is easy to show that Hd has
the same Herbrand models as the set Hd1  In [ fHr: r 2 PIn;I g, and from this it fol-
lows that Hd and Hd1 have the same minimal models. The second part is proved
analogously. 
Lemma 5. Let P  EGLP, and s 2 P , s  Bs) F1 ^ F2, with F1; F2 formulas. Then
P st P ÿ fsg [ fBs) F1;Bs) F2g.
Proof. Let Q : P ÿ fsg [ fBs) F1;Bs) F2g, and trs  fBs) F1;Bs) F2g.
We show that ModscP  ModscQ.
(1) ModscP  ModscQ.
Let I be a stable model of P and Inn<x a stable chain for I . We show that Inn<x
is a Q-stable chain for I . It suces to prove that In1 is a minimal model of
In [ fHr: r 2 QIn;I g. This is implied by the fact that the sets HnQ  fHr: r 2
QIn;I g and HnP   fHr: r 2 PIn;Ig have the same Herbrand models. Let r 2 fsg
be such that r  Br ) F r1 ^ F r2 . We show the following condition (H):
For all r 2 fsg: F r1 ^ F r2 2 HnP  if and only if fF r1 ; F r2 g  HnQ. If F r1 ^ F r2 2
HnP  then In; I   Br, and hence fF r1 ; F r2 g  HnQ. If fF r1 ; F r2 g  HnQ, then
again In; I   Br and this implies F r1 ^ F r2 2 HnP . The condition (H) implies that
the sets HnP  and HnQ have the same Herbrand models and hence the same
minimal models.
(2) ModscQ ModscP. This condition is proved analogously to (1). 
Corollary 6. There is a finite set R of admissible transformation rules such that for ev-
ery finite extended general logic program P there exists a program Q in normal form
such that P !HR Q.
Proof. Let P be a finite extended general logic program, s 2 P . We carry out the fol-
lowing steps. First of all, we can transform s to F ) G, where F : VBs, G : WHs,
by Lemma 4. Now both F and G can be transformed into a logically equivalent (see
Definition 3) conjunctive normal form (denoted by F1 and G1) by a finite set of ad-
missible transformation rules. We will not go into details about how this is done, but
by inspection of the model relation of Definition 1 one can see that we can first move
all strong negations as far inward as possible (until they are directly in front of an
atom). Treating these classical literals as atoms we can form a conjunctive normal
form in the standard way (treating weak negation as classical negation). Again by
Lemma 4, P st P ÿ fsg [ fF1 ) G1g. If G1  C1 ^    ^ Cn, then by repeated use
8 J. Engelfriet, H. Herre / J. Logic Programming 41 (1999) 1–25
of the rule described in Lemma 5 we finally get a program Q in normal form being
stable equivalent to P. 
Corollary 7. There is a finite set R of admissible transformation rules such that for ev-
ery extended general logic program P there exists a program Q in normal form such
that P st Q. If P is recursively enumerable then Q can be chosen to be recursively enu-
merable.
Remark. The following rule fF1 _ F2 ) Hg ! fF1 ) H ; F2 ) Hg cannot be used be-
cause this rule, though logically true, does not preserve stability (see, however, Pro-
position 10).
Example 3. P  fb _ ÿb) bg, and Q  fb) b;ÿb) bg. While P has the stable
model fbg Q has no stable model.
In Example 3 we could replace P by f) bg. This rule has the form
Bs) Hs; f) Hsf g:VBs is a tautologyg. But this rule is not admissible because
it is not decidable. Thus we may summarize the results on normal forms by the fol-
lowing proposition.
Proposition 8. Every program in EGLP can be transformed by a finite set of ad-
missible transformation rules into an equivalent program in which each rule has the
form F1; . . . ; Fn ) G1; . . . ;Gm in which each Fi is a disjunction of literals from
XLit, and each Gi is in XLit. We say such a rule (and the program) is in normal
form.
Concerning abstract expressivity of programs in (special) normal form, the fol-
lowing problem remains open.
Question 1.
1. EGLP6 Modsc SNF EGLP?
2. GLP6 Mods SNF GLP?
3. SNF GLP 6 Mods SLP?
4. Minimal partial temporal logic
In this section we will describe a partial temporal semantics for logic programs.
The semantics is obtained by translating a logic program into a non-monotonic par-
tial temporal logic. This logic was first used to give a temporal semantics to default
logic [3]. The idea behind the temporal framework is that a temporal theory describes
the reasoning process of a (non-monotonic) agent. A number of dierent forms of
reasoning were treated in this fashion in Ref. [4]. Although the full temporal logic
is more general (it uses S5 models instead of partial models, and temporal operators
may be nested), we will describe a simpler variant here that is sucient to give se-
mantics to logic programming. First we will formally introduce minimal partial tem-
poral logic.
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Definition 7 (Partial model ).
1. A partial model M for the signature r is an assignment of a truth value from
f0; 1; ug to each of the atoms of r. This assignment can be extended to arbitrary
closed quantifier free formulas according to the following tables

0 1
1 0
u u
^ 0 1 u
0 0 0 0
1 0 1 u
u 0 u u
_ 0 1 u
0 0 1 u
1 1 1 1
u u 1 u
2. The ordering of truth values is defined by u6 0, u6 1, u6 u, 16 1, 06 0. This is
extended to partial models by: M 6N if for all atoms a we have Ma6Na.
A partial model describes which formulas the agent knows (or, has derived) at any
point in time. To give an account of the total reasoning process of an agent, we have
to describe what the agent knows (has derived) at all points in time. The reasoning of
the agent is assumed to start at some point, and continues in a discrete manner:
based on what the agent knows, it may apply some (non-monotonic) inference steps
to arrive at a new state of knowledge (described by a partial model), from which it
may again apply inference steps. We will take the natural numbers (x) as our flow of
time. We will assume here that the agent does not forget or revise its knowledge while
reasoning, so that its knowledge is non-decreasing over time.
Definition 8 (Partial temporal model ). A partial temporal model M is a sequence
fMtgt2x of partial models such that for all t 2 x, we have Mt6Mt1. The ordering
6 is extended to partial temporal models by
M6N()Mt6Nt 8t 2 x
It is straightforward to check that the agent does not lose knowledge over time if
its reasoning process is described by a partial temporal model: if Mta  1 (for a
formula a that does not contain weak negation) then Msa  1 for every s P t.
Whenever we have M6N, then this means that M contains less (or equal) know-
ledge than N, at each time point.
The temporal language in which the reasoning of an agent can be described, is a
restricted version of the language introduced in Ref. [3]. For each closed formula
a 2 L0r, there are four basic expressions in the language that describe the truth
of a in time: Ca, which states that the agent currently knows a, F a, which states that
the agent will know a sometimes in the future, Ga, stating that the agent knows a al-
ways in the future, and Xa, stating that the agent will know a at the next moment in
time; these basic expressions are called temporal atoms. Unlike propositional formu-
las in a partial model, these temporal atoms are two-valued: the atom F a, for exam-
ple, is true at time t if a is true (has value 1) in a future partial model, and is false
otherwise (either a becomes false (0) at some time in the future, or it remains un-
known throughout the future). This also explains the use of the C operator: it allows
us to express the current value of a formula. A formula a is currently true if Ca is,
false if C  a is true, and unknown if :Ca ^ :C  a is true. So we have a classical,
two-valued, temporal logic to express facts about changing partial information. The
set of temporal formulas is the smallest set of expressions containing the temporal
atoms and closed with respect to the propositional connectives f^;:;_;!g.
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Definition 9 (Semantics). Let M be a partial temporal model, and let t 2 x.
1. For a closed formula a 2 L0r:
· M; t  Ca()Mta  1
· M; t  F a()Msa  1 for some s > t
· M; t  Ga()Msa  1 for all s > t
· M; t  Xa()Mt1a  1
2. For two temporal formulas u;w:
· M; t  u ^ w() M; t  u and M; t  w
· M; t  :u() M; t = u
3. Implication (!) and disjunction (_) for temporal formulas are defined as usual
from conjunction and negation: u! w  :u _ w and u _ w  ::u ^ :w.
4. A formula u is true in M, denoted M  u, if M; t  u for all t 2 x. A set of
temporal formulas Th is true in a model M, denoted M  Th, if M  u for all
u 2 Th. Two temporal formulas u;w are equivalent if M; t  u() M; t  w
for all partial temporal models M and t 2 x.
Even though we want to describe the reasoning process of an agent, we are of
course interested in the final outcomes of this reasoning process. This is expressed
by the limit of a partial temporal model.
Definition 10 (Limit model). Let M be a partial temporal model. Then the limit of M,
denoted lim M, is the partial model defined by:
lim Ma 
1 if there exists t 2 x such that Mta  1
0 if there exists t 2 x such that Mta  0
u otherwise
8<:
Using the temporal language, we can describe the reasoning behavior of the agent.
The temporal formulas prescribe when the agent should make an inference. But we
also want the agent to know (or derive) nothing more than that (we do not want to
describe explicitly what it should not derive). So we want to make sure that the
knowledge of the agent over time satisfies the temporal formulas, but otherwise is
minimal. The following definition formalizes this.
Definition 11 (Minimal model). Let Th be a temporal theory and let M be a partial
temporal model. Then M is a minimal model of Th, denoted M min Th, if
· M  Th and
· for any partial temporal model N, if N  Th and N6M, then N M.
The minimal temporal models of a theory describe the intended possible behavior
of the agent over time.
5. A temporal interpretation of logic programs
We are interested in the connections between logic programs (with the semantics
of stable generated models) and theories in partial temporal logic. It turns out that
there is a faithful translation of logic programs into formulas of minimal partial
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temporal logic. The translation will take rules in normal form to temporal formulas.
To get an intuitive idea, we will look at a sequent and interpret its application tem-
porally. So consider a ground rule F1; . . . ; Fn ) G1; . . . Gm in normal form. Obvious-
ly, the temporal reasoning behavior of an agent that knows this rule is to apply it
whenever possible: if the left hand side is applicable at any moment in time, then
it will change its state of knowledge according to the right hand side, and this change
will result in a (generally) dierent state at the next moment in time. We will translate
this rule into an implication, where the right hand side refers to the next moment in
time. Now every Gi is either of the form di or of the form ÿdi for a classical literal di.
In the first case, this di should be known in the next state, so we translate it with Xdi.
In the second case, di should not be known in the next state, so we translate it with
:Xdi. Now let us look at the left hand side. Each Fi is a disjunction containing literals
and weakly negated literals. The translation of a literal is easy: we express that it
should be known now: Cl (where l is the literal). The case of a weakly negated literal
ÿc is more dicult: we could translate it with :Cc, but this is not correct. If we con-
sider the semantics of stable generated models of Definition 5, then the left hand side
should be true not only in the ‘current’ model Ia, but it should remain true through-
out the sequence. For a literal, this is not a problem: if it is true now, it remains true
in the future. But for weakly negated literals like ÿc, this is not true: c may be un-
known now, but become true later. Therefore, the translation is :Fc: the literal c may
not become true in the future (implying that it is not true now). Under this transla-
tion, there is a temporal interpretation of logic programs with stable generated se-
mantics in the sense that there is a correspondence between stable generated
models of a program and the minimal models of its translation. The reason that min-
imal partial temporal models should be considered is the following (intuitively): the
translation (see Definition 12 below) prescribes that the rules should be fired when-
ever applicable. But we want the knowledge generated in this fashion to be all the
knowledge: no extra knowledge may be present at any point in time. This can be
eectuated by taking minimal models. The above discussion will be made formal
below.
We will make one additional assumption on rules in normal form.
Assumption 1. Let F1; . . . ; Fn ) G1; . . . Gm be a ground rule in normal form. From
now on, we will assume that none of the disjunctions Fi contains a complementary
literal pair fl;ÿlg with l 2 Lit0.
This is not a true limitation: when a rule s 2 P  in normal form is given, we can
delete any formula Fi that contains a complementary literal pair from the body. This
yields a stable equivalent program.
Lemma 9. For a ground rule F1; . . . ; Fn ) G1; . . . Gm in normal form, and interpreta-
tions I and M, we have: I ;M   F1; . . . ; Fn () for all 16 i6 n there is li 2 Fi: li 2
Lit0 and li 2 I ; or li  ÿk for some k 2 Lit0 and k 62 M .
Proof. ‘(’: Let J be an interpretation such that I  J  M , and let 16 i6 n. Suppose
there is an li in Fi with li 2 Lit0 and li 2 I . Then li 2 J so J  li. Otherwise there is an
li in Fi with li  ÿb (and b 2 Lit0) and b 62 M . But then b 62 J so J  li. This means
that J  Fi. We conclude that I ;M   F1; . . . ; Fn.
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‘)’: Suppose there is an Fi with 8l 2 Fi: if l 2 Lit0 then l 62 I and if l  ÿb with
b 2 Lit0 then b 2 M . Define J  I [ fb j ÿb 2 Fi and b 2 Lit0g. It is easy to see that
J is a coherent interpretation with I  J  M . Take l 2 Fi. If l 2 Lit0 then l 62 I
so l 62 J (this uses the assumption that Fi does not contain a complementary literal
pair) so J = l. If l  ÿb for b 2 Lit0 then b 2 J so J = l. We conclude that J = Fi
so I ;M   F1; . . . ; Fn. 
Definition 12. Let s 2 EGLP be in normal form, say s  F1; . . . ; Fn ) G1; . . . ;Gm, with
Fi  bi1 _    _ bili _ ÿci1 _    _ ÿcimi and Gj  dj for 16 j6 j0 for a j0 with
06 j06m and Gj  ÿej for j0 < j6m, where each bi; ci; di; ei is a member of Lit0
and li;mi; k; j P 0. Define the function trans as follows
transFi  Cbi1 _    _ Cbili _ :Fci1 _    _ :Fcimi
transdi  Xdi
transÿei  :Xei
transs  transF1 ^    ^ transFn ! transG1 _    _ transGm
For P  EGLP in normal form, transP   ftranss j s 2 P g.
The following theorem is the main result of this section. It shows that the above
translation is faithful (e.g., it preserves semantics), thus establishing the temporal
interpretation of logic programs with stable generated models.
For a partial model M , define LitM  fl 2 Lit0 j Ml  1g.
Theorem 1. Let P  EGLP be in normal form, then
1. For every stable generated model I of P , generated by the x-chain I0  I1    
there exists a minimal partial temporal model Mtt2x of trans(P) such that Lit
Mt  It for all t 2 x and Litlim M  I .
2. For every minimal partial temporal model Mtt2x of trans(P) there exists a stable
generated model I, generated by an x-chain I06 I16    such that LitMt  It for
all t 2 x and Litlim M  I .
Proof. 1. Let I06 I16    be a P-stable x-chain generating the stable generated model
I . Define Mtt2x by:
Mta 
1 if a 2 It
0 if  a 2 It
u otherwise
8<:
Then this is a partial temporal model and it is easy to see that
lim Ma 
1 if a 2 I
0 if  a 2 I
u otherwise
8<:
· M  transP : Let F1; . . . Fn ) G1; . . . ;Gm be a rule from P  and let t 2 x.
Suppose M; t  transF1 ^    ^ transFn. Take an Fi and suppose Fi  l1 _
   _ lk _ ÿm1 _    _ ÿmj where li;mi 2 Lit0. Then M; t  Cl1 _    _ Clk_
:Fm1 _    _ :Fmj. If M; t  Cli for some i, then Mtli  1 so li 2 It. If not,
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then M; t  :Fmi for some i, so lim Mmi 6 1, which means that mi 62 I . With
Lemma 9 it follows that It;M  F1; . . . ; Fn so It1  G1 _    _ Gm, so for some i,
we have It1  Gi. If Gi 2 Lit0 then Gi 2 It1 so Mt1Gi  1 so M; t  XGi. If
Gi  ÿb where b 2 Lit0, then b 62 It1 so M; t  :Xb. We have proved that
M; t  transG1 _    _ transGm. We conclude that M  transP .
· M min transP: Suppose N is a partial temporal model such that N <M and
N  transP . Let t0 be the smallest index for which Nt0 <Mt0 and let
J  LitNt0. Note first of all that t0 > 0 (since M0a  u for all atoms a). Then
we have It0ÿ1  J  It0 and J 6 It0 . Let F1; . . . ; Fn ) G1; . . . ;Gm be a rule from P 
and suppose It0ÿ1; I   F1; . . . ; Fn. Choose an Fi and suppose there is an l in Fi with
l 2 Lit0 such that l 2 It0ÿ1. Then N; t0 ÿ 1  transFi. If not, then by Lemma 9
there is an l 2 Fi with l  ÿb, where b 2 Lit0 such that b 62 I . Then we have that
M; t0 ÿ 1  :Fb and as N <M it follows that N; t0 ÿ 1  :Fb. As N; t0 ÿ
1  transF1 ^    ^ transFn andN  transP it must be the case that N; t0 ÿ
1  transG1 _    _ transGm so for some i we have N; t0 ÿ 1  transGi. If
Gi  b where b 2 Lit0, then N; t0 ÿ 1  Xb so Nt0b  1 so b 2 J so J  Gi.
Otherwise, if Gi  ÿb (b 2 Lit0) then N; t0 ÿ 1  :Xb so Nt0b 6 1 so b 62 J
so J  Gi. In both cases we have that J  G1 _    _ Gm. This means that J is
an extension of It0ÿ1 satisfying the heads of the clauses whose body is satisfied
in It0ÿ1; I , smaller than It0 which contradicts the definition of a stable chain.
Therefore, such a model N can not exist, so M min transP.
2. Suppose M min transP. Define I  Litlim M and It  LitMt for t 2 x.
Then we have I0  I1      I and I 
S1
t0 It. We will show that I0; I1; . . . is a P-sta-
ble chain.
· First of all, I0  ;. For if not, we can define a partial model N by N0a  u for
all atoms a and Nt Mt for t > 0. It is easy to see that N <M and
N  transP , which contradicts the minimality of M.
· Let t 2 x; we will show that It1 satisfies the heads of all clauses whose body is
satisfied in It; I . Let F1; . . . ; Fn ) G1; . . . Gm be a rule in P , and suppose
It; I   F1; . . . ; Fn. Take an Fi; if there is a b 2 Lit0 in Fi such that b 2 It, then
M; t  Cb. If not, then by Lemma 9 there must be a b 2 Lit0 such that ÿb 2
Fi and b 62 I . This means that lim Mb 6 1, so M; t  :Fb. In both cases we
have that M; t  transF1 ^    ^ transFn and as M  transP  it follows that
M; t  transG1 _    _ transGm. So, for some i it must be the case that
M; t  transGi. If Gi  b 2 Lit0, then M; t  Xb, so Mt1b  1 so
b 2 It1. If Gi  ÿb for a b 2 Lit0, then M; t  :Xb so Mt1b 6 1 so b 62 It1.
In both cases we have that It1  Gi so It1  G1 _    _ Gm.
· Now suppose J is an extension of It satisfying the heads of all applicable clauses
and J  It1 but J 6 It1. Define the partial temporal model N as follows:
Nt1a 
1 if a 2 J
0 if  a 2 J
u otherwise
8<:
and Ns Ms for s 6 t  1. It can easily be checked that N is a partial temporal
model and that N <M. Now let s 2 x and let F1; . . . ; Fn ) G1; . . . ;Gm be a rule
from P . Suppose that N; s  transF1 ^    ^ transFn. First we will treat the case
when s 6 t. Since N <M we have that M; s  transF1 ^    ^ transFn
(Ns6Ms and lim N  lim M). As M  transP  we get M; s  transG1 _    _
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transGm and as Ms1 Ns1 it follows that N; s  transG1 _    _ transGm.
Now suppose s  t. Consider an Fi, then N; s  transFi. If there is a b 2 Lit0 in
Fi with N; t  Cb then M; t  Cb (Nt Mt) so b 2 It. Otherwise there must
be a b 2 Lit0 such that ÿb 2 Fi and N; t  :Fb. But then we have M; t  :Fb
so b 62 I . From Lemma 9 we conclude that It; I   F1; . . . ; Fn so J  G1 _    _ Gm.
Therefore, for some i we have J  Gi. If Gi  b 2 Lit0, then b 2 J , so Nt1b  1
so N; t  Xb. If Gi  ÿb for a b 2 Lit0, then b 62 J so N; t  :Xb. In both cases
we have that N; t  transGi so N; t  transG1 _    _ transGm. This means
that N  transP which contradicts the assumption that M is a minimal model of
transP . Therefore, such an interpretation J can not exist, and It1 is a minimal ex-
tension of It satisfying the heads of applicable clauses. We have proved that
I0; I1; . . . ; I is a P-stable chain generating I . From the definition of stable chain it
follows that I is a model of P . 
We will give an example.
Example 4 (Continued Example). The temporal translation Example 1 is
fXa _ Xb;Ca! Xb;:Fa! Xag
This theory has only one minimal model:
time
atoms
0 1 2 3 . . .
a u 1 1 1 . . .
b u u 1 1 . . .
It is easy to see that this model corresponds to the stable generated model of the orig-
inal program and to the stable chain generating it.
The following example gives a temporal explanation of the absence of stable gen-
erated models (or answer sets) of a logic program.
Example 5. Consider the program consisting of the single sequent ÿa) a. This
program has no stable generated model (or answer set). Now consider its trans-
lation: :Fa! Xa. In our partial temporal logic, this is equivalent to Fa: the lit-
eral a must become true sometimes in the future. This formula has temporal
models: models in which a is unknown for some time, and becomes true (and
remains true) from some time point onwards. But it does not have a minimal
model: whenever we have a model M of Fa, then we can construct the model
N in which a becomes true one point in time later. This new model is smaller
in the ordering: N <M. Thus there is a decreasing sequence of temporal mod-
els without a minimum. The temporal intuition is that this rule states that a
must become true at some point in time, but it does not state when: it is not
an instruction to add a to the knowledge, but a constraint that this should
be done at some point in time. Of course, if we add a rule ) a (translated into
> ! Xa then there is a minimal model, and there is a stable generated model
(and an answer set).
The translation into temporal logic simplifies the proof of the following proposi-
tion, which continues the discussion on normal forms of Section 3.
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Proposition 10. For every extended general logic program P, there exists a stable equiv-
alent program Q which is in special normal form, i.e., all its rules are of the form
F1; . . . ; Fm ) G1; . . . ;Gn where the Fi and Gj are in XLit.
Proof. Let P  EGLP. By Proposition 8, P can be transformed into a stable equiv-
alent program P 0 in normal form. Then we can take P 0, the Herbrand instantiation
of P 0, and delete, for every rule, any Fi in the body which contains a complementary
literal pair fl;ÿlg with l 2 Lit0. Let the result be P 00. Now consider any rule s 2 P 00,
say s  F1; . . . ; Fm ) G1; . . . ;Gn, and suppose that Fk  b1 _    _ blk _ ÿc1 _    _
ÿcmk for some 16 k6m. Then transs  transF1 ^    ^ transFm ! transG1 _
   _ transGn and transFk  Cb1 _    _ Cblk _ :Fc1 _    _ :Fcmk. But in par-
tial temporal logic, the connectives behave classically: for any temporal model M
and t 2 x it holds that M; t  a ^ b _ c ! d if and only if M; t  a ^ b! d
and M; t  a ^ c! d. This means that we may replace transs by the rules
transF1 ^    ^ Cb1 ^    ^ ! transG1 _    _ transGn
..
.
transF1 ^    ^ Cblk ^    ^ ! transG1 _    _ transGn
transF1 ^    ^ :Fc1 ^    ^ ! transG1 _    _ transGn
..
.
transF1 ^    ^ :Fcmk ^    ^ ! transG1 _    _ transGn
Let T be the temporal theory obtained from transP 00 by performing the above op-
eration until there are no more disjunctions on the left hand side of any implication.
Then T contains only formulas of the form Ca1 ^    ^ Can ^ :Fb1 ^    ^ :
Fbm ! Xd1 _    _ Xdk _ :Xe1 _    _ :Xel. But such a formula is the translation of
the rule a1;    ; an;ÿb1; . . . ;ÿbm ) d1; . . . ; dk;ÿe1; . . . ;ÿel. This means we can find
a program Q such that transQ is exactly T . This Q is in special normal form. Fur-
thermore, P is stable equivalent to P 0, which is equivalent (stable, but also classically)
to P 0, which is in turn equivalent to P 00. Stable models of P 00 correspond to minimal
temporal models of transP 00, which is equivalent to T (and therefore has the same
minimal temporal models). But T  transQ, so the minimal temporal models of T
correspond to stable generated models of Q. We conclude that Q is stable equivalent
to P . 
The constructed program Q is, in general, infinite. This leads to the following.
Question 2. Does there exist a finite set R of admissible transformation rules such
that every finite extended generalized logic program can be transformed using R into
a finite stable equivalent logic program in special normal form?
We conclude this section by considering another approach to giving a dynamic
semantics to logic programming, namely the interpretation of logic programs (only
normal logic programs) in the situation calculus of Lin and Reiter [15]. The basic
idea is that the application of a program clause is an action in the situation calculus,
with the eect of enlarging the set of known literals. The frame problem (facts only
become known as an eect of a program clause application action, otherwise they
remain as they were) is then solved using the technique of Ref. [18]. The interesting
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thing is to see how a program clause is translated into the situation calculus. First of
all, every predicate F ~x is translated to a situation calculus predicate F ~x; s so that a
predicate can be true or not in a situation. A situation in the situation calculus should
be compared to a point in time in our own temporal interpretation of logic pro-
grams. A clause of the form
F ~x:ÿ G
where G is a sequence of predicates and negated (weakly) predicates which may con-
tain variables, is translated into
Gs ! F ~x; doA~x; s:
Here Gs is the translation of G (we will come back to this), A is the name of the ac-
tion of applying this sequent (every action must have a name in the situation calcu-
lus), and do is the function that returns the new situation that results from the
application of an action in a situation. If we interpret doA~x; s as the next situa-
tion, then this translation is very similar to our temporal form. In fact, this similarity
goes even further if we consider the translation of G. Not bothering with the vari-
ables (we can always take ground instantiations), suppose G  a1; . . . ; an;
ÿb1; . . . ;ÿbm. Then the translation Gs is
Gs  a1s ^    ^ ans ^ :9s0b1s0 ^    ^ :9s0bms0:
The parts :9s0bis0 play the role of looking into the future (some axioms are used
for the situation calculus which ensure that all situations are the eect of applying
actions to the initial state) and are analogous to our :Fbi! One dierence between
their approach and ours is that they use situations, and we use natural numbers.
In fact, this probably makes our approach more similar to the approach of Wallace
[21], also discussed in Ref. [14]. One proof of the usefulness of their approach is that
dynamic control aspects can be modeled (which is also one of the aspects of reason-
ing we hope to be able to model using temporal logic). This is shown, for example, by
the ability to model the Prolog cut operator ! in the situation calculus [13]. In this
formalization, the ability to name the action of applying a clause, is used in an essen-
tial manner. Since our temporal interpretation does not use explicit names for the
action of applying a sequent, it would be interesting to see if we can also model
the cut operator in our interpretation.
6. From temporal theories to logic programs
We have shown that logic programs can be translated (via a normal form) to for-
mulas of minimal partial temporal logic in a modular way (the translation of a pro-
gram is the union of the translations of its sequents). The translation preserves the
semantics (in the sense of Theorem 1). But how about the other way, i.e., is there
a modular translation of minimal partial temporal logic into logic programs (en-
dowed with the stable generated semantics)? For this question to be answered pos-
itively, it is sucient (and necessary) that temporal formulas in a normal form can
be translated. Essentially, the temporal language is a propositional language using
the temporal atoms as its propositional atoms. Therefore, any temporal formula is
equivalent to a formula in conjunctive normal form, and we may focus on the dis-
juncts. As knowledge is not forgotten or revised in partial temporal models, it is
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the case that Ga is equivalent to Xa. We may thus concentrate on disjunctions con-
taining atoms Ca, :Ca, F a, :F a, Xa, and :Xa. It is easy to see that temporal oper-
ators distribute over conjunction and disjunction, e.g. Ca ^ b is equivalent to
Ca ^ Cb, and Ca _ b is equivalent to Ca _ Cb. This means that an atom Ca is
equivalent to Ca0, where a0 is in conjunctive normal form (or disjunctive normal
form) of a. We may then distribute the C operator over the conjunctions and disjunc-
tions. So we can even restrict ourselves to disjunctions of temporal atoms over prop-
ositional literals. Any disjunction not containing atoms of the form Cl or :Fl can be
translated faithfully to a sequent. Consider a disjunction of the following form (for
clarity, we include only one of each sort of temporal atom):
:Ca _ Fb _ Xc _ :Xd
where a; b; c; d 2 Lit0. This is equivalent to the implication
Ca ^ :Fb! Xc _ :Xd
This is just the translation of the sequent
a;ÿb) c; d
So how about the other two sorts of atoms? An easy example of a formula that
can not be translated is Ca. Its only minimal partial temporal model assigns 1 to a
and u to any other atoms, for every time point. However, any stable chain starts with
the empty set. So, no logic program has a stable chain equivalent to this minimal
partial temporal model. One might think that the only formulas that can not be
translated, are formulas that have a minimal partial temporal model M for which
M0 does not correspond to the empty set. This not true, however, as witnessed by
the following set of formulas:
1 Xa
2 Ca! Xb
3 Ca ^ Cb! Xc
4 Ca ^ :Cb! Xd
5 Ca ^ Cb ^ Cc! Xd
The conjunction of these formulas has two minimal models:
M:
0 1 2 3 . . .
a u 1 1 1 . . .
b u u 1 1 . . .
c u u u 1 . . .
d u u 1 1 . . .
N:
0 1 2 3 . . .
a u 1 1 1 . . .
b u 1 1 1 . . .
c u u 1 1 . . .
d u u u 1 . . .
These models can not both correspond to stable chains of the same program. Since
they have the same limit model, the same sequents are applicable with respect to
;; Litlim M as with respect to ;; Litlim N. Since fag must be an extension
of the empty set satisfying the heads of clauses whose bodies is satisfied in
;; Litlim M, it is impossible that fa; bg is a minimal such extension. Both of these
minimal models start with a partial model corresponding to the empty set. Note that
formula (4) above uses an atom :Cb on the left of the implication (corresponding to
Cb in the disjunction).
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7. An interpretation of logic programs in disjunctive default logic
In the previous sections, we have seen that there is a faithful translation of extend-
ed generalized logic programs (with stable generated models) into partial temporal
logic (with minimal models). Now let us consider (non-disjunctive) normal logic pro-
grams. For these programs, stable generated models coincide with answer sets. Fur-
thermore, there is a faithful translation of these programs into default logic (see Ref.
[6]). And there is a faithful translation of default logic into minimal temporal epis-
temic logic (the counterpart of minimal partial temporal logic using S5 models;
see Ref. [3]). So in the case of non-disjunctive conclusions, there is a homogeneous
group of semantics for rules: answer sets, stable generated models, default logic
and minimal temporal logic. When allowing disjunctions in the conclusion, however,
there is a division: the stable generated models are still in correspondence with the
minimal temporal models of the translation, but they are dierent from the answer
sets. So the question is: how about default logic?
In order to assess the behavior of default logic for disjunctive conclusions, there
has to be a definition of extension for disjunctive defaults. By a first-order default d
we understand an expression of the form d :  a: b1; . . . ; bn = c, where a; bi; c are
first-order formulas of the language Lr;:;^;_; 8; 9. Classical negation is denoted
by :, and CnX  denotes the classical deductive closure of a set X of first-order sen-
tences. A default d is said to be open if every of the formulas in d is quantifier-free.
Let us denote prd : a (prerequisite of d), justd  fb1; . . . ; bng the justification of
d, and consd  c the consequence of d. In the following we consider only open de-
faults and their closed instantiations. Then, we may assume that all formulas under
consideration are propositional.
In principle, it is already possible to have a disjunctive conclusion in default logic.
Since defaults are made of propositional formulas, we could write a default like
 p: q = r _ s. Supposing that p is an axiom, this leads to a single extension in which,
besides p, we have the formula r _ s. We would like, however, a commitment to one
of the disjuncts. One of the reasons to want commitment is that it allows reasoning
by cases: suppose we have two extra defaults:  r: t = t and  s: t = t. In Reiter’s de-
fault logic, we would still have only one extension, with p and r _ s. The fact t is not
present, since neither of the defaults is applicable as neither of the prerequisites is
present. A new version of disjunctive default logic should lead to two extensions,
one with p, r and t, and one with p, s and t. The fact t is then in both extensions,
and would thus count as a (sceptical) conclusion. A version of disjunctive default
logic was introduced in Ref. [9], from which we repeat the following definitions. A
disjunctive default is an expression of the form  a: b1; . . . ; bn = c1j    jcn , where
a; bi and cj are formulas.
Definition 13 ([8]). Let D be a set of disjunctive defaults and E a set of sentences.
MinED is the set of all minimal deductively closed sets M satisfying the following
condition for every a: b1; . . . ; bm=c1j    jcn 2 D: if a 2 M , and :b1; . . . ;:bm 62 E,
then fc1; . . . ; cng \M 6 ;. E is an extension of D if E 2 MinED.
This definition is clearly a generalization of the original fix-point definition of an
extension. Also, if disjunctive logic programs are translated into disjunctive default
logic in the straightforward way, then answer sets are in a one-to-one correspon-
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dence with the extensions of the translation. However, there is also a semi-construc-
tive definition, which is equivalent in the non-disjunctive case. It turns out that if we
generalize this semi-constructive definition (which is more in the spirit of stable gen-
erated models and minimal temporal models), we get a somewhat dierent notion
(see Ref. [1]).
Definition 14. Let D be a set of disjunctive defaults. A deductively closed set E of sen-
tences is a generated extension of D if there is a sequence E0  E1      En     of
deductively closed sets of sentences such that
1. E0  Cn;;
2. En1 is a minimal extension of En satisfying the following closure condition
ClgenE: if  a: b1; . . . ; bk = c1j    jcl  2 D, a 2 En, and :b1; . . . ;:bk 62 E then
fc1; . . . ; clg \ En1 6 ;
and E  Sn<x En.
In the case of non-disjunctive defaults, both definitions above coincide with the
original definition of Ref. [19]. In Ref. [1] it was shown that extensions of a disjunc-
tive default theory in the sense of Ref. [9] are generated extensions. The converse,
however, is not true.
Example 6. This corresponds to the earlier example, D  f: = ajb a: = b
 ::a = ag. Then E  Cnfa; bg is a generated extension of D: E0  Cn;,
E1  Cnfag, E2  Cnfa; bg. But E is not an extension. It does satisfy the closure
condition with respect to itself, but Cnfbg also satisfies it, so MinED  fCnfbgg.
In fact, if we translate disjunctive logic programs into disjunctive default logic,
then stable generated models of the program are in a one-to-one correspondence
with the generated extensions of the translation (see Theorem 2 below). It can also
be shown that there is a faithful translation of disjunctive default logic (with gener-
ated extensions) into minimal temporal epistemic logic (see Ref. [2]). So in the case of
disjunctive rules, the former homogeneous group is split into two groups: on the one
hand answer sets and disjunctive default logic of Ref. [8] (and an essentially non-tem-
poral translation into minimal temporal epistemic logic, see Ref. [2]), and on the
other hand stable generated models, minimal temporal epistemic logic and disjunc-
tive default logic with generated extensions.
Let us first formally give the (somewhat more general) result that logic programs
with stable generated models can be faithfully translated into default logic with gen-
erated extensions, establishing the second important semantic link (where the first
one is the link between stable generated models and minimal temporal models of
the translated program). In Ref. [1] it is shown that every super logic program P
(see Ref. [16]) can be translated into a default theory trP  such that the generated
extensions of trP  and the stable generated models of P coincide in a well-defined
sense. We recall this result. Let r : a1; . . . ; al;:K1; . . . ;:Km ) c1; . . . ; cn be a super
rule; where Kj  bj1 ^    ^ bjpj , for 16 j6m. We translate such a rule to the following
disjunctive default rule: trr : a1 ^    ^ al::K1; . . . ;:Km = c1j    jcn. Let
AtE  fa: a is a ground atom with E  ag.
Theorem 2. Let P be a super logic program, tr(P) the default theory given by the above
translation of P. If a set I of ground atoms is a stable generated model of P then there is
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a generated extension E of tr(P) such that IAt (E). If E is a generated extension of
tr(P), then At(E) is a stable generated model of P.
Obviously, every disjunctive default theory of a special form can be translated
faithfully into a super logic program. A natural question is then whether we can
translate any disjunctive default theory into a logic program in a faithful way, and
this is the subject of the next section.
8. From default theories to logic programs
We now consider more complex logic programs and defaults and use for this pur-
pose the framework of partial logic with two negations. As in Section 7 we assume
open defaults and their closed instantiations such that all formulas can be assumed
to be propositional. We want to embed default logic in stable generated semantics of
extended generalized logic programs. In contrast to default logic, logic programming
on the one hand is based on partial logic, and on the other hand commits to disjunc-
tions. This last feature was taken care of in disjunctive default logic, but in order to
handle the second, we need a new version of the notion of an extension of a default
theory. We use partial logic with one negation (:) over coherent partial interpreta-
tions whose closure operation we have denoted by C0 (see Section 2). A set X is said
to be constructively closed if C0X   X . For X , being a consistent set of ground
literals and a being a sentence, we write X  a to indicate that X is a (partial) model
of a.
Lemma 11. Let X be a consistent set of ground literals and a a propositional sentence
from Lr;_;^;:. Then: a 2 C0X  () X  a.
Proof. The claim of this lemma follows from the fact that X is a (partial) model of
C0X . 4 
For a set X of sentences from L_;^;:, let LitX  be the set of literals which are
members of X .
Definition 15. Let D be a set of disjunctive defaults. A constructively closed set E of
sentences is a constructively generated extension of D if there is a sequence E0  E1 
    En     of constructively closed sets of sentences such that
1. E0  C0;;
2. En1 is a minimal constructively closed extension of En satisfying the following
closure condition ClcgenE: if  a: b1; . . . ; bk = c1 j    j cl 2 D, a 2 En, and
:b1; . . . ;:bk 62 E then ci 2 C0LitEn1 for some 16 i6 l.
3. E  Sn<x En.
The language in which defaults are expressed, contains classical negation (:),
whereas logic programs contain weak (ÿ) and strong () negation. Semantically,
4 This is not true for CnX .
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classical negation should correspond to strong negation. When translating sentences
from the classical language to the language of logic programming, all classical nega-
tions should therefore be replaced by strong negation (and vice versa when translat-
ing the other way). To avoid notational clutter, we will not explicitly show this
translation. The reader is instructed to change classical negation signs to strong ne-
gation when moving from the default language to logic programming (and vice
versa).
Let d : a: b1; . . . ;bn=c1 j    j cl be a default rule. Define
lpd  a;ÿ  b1; . . . ;ÿ  bn ) c1; . . . ; cl
and lpD  flpdjd 2 Dg. We will show that this provides a faithful embedding of
default logic based on constructively generated extensions, into logic programming
based on stable generated models. We first prove a lemma.
Lemma 12. Let I0  I1     be a sequence of Herbrand interpretations with
I  Sn<x In, and let E0  E1     be a sequence of constructively closed sets of sen-
tences with E  Sn<x En. For a set of (disjunctive) defaults D, define
Xn  fs 2 lpD j In; I   Bsg
Dn  fd 2 D j if d  a: b1; . . . ; bk=c1 j    j cl
then a 2 En and :b1; . . . ;:bk 62 Eg
If En  C0In for all n < x, then
Dn  fd j lpd 2 Xng; n  1; 2; 3 . . .
Proof. Suppose d 2 Dn, with d  a: b1; . . . ; bk=c1 j    j cl. Then a 2 En  C0In, so
In  a (by Lemma 12) which implies In; I   a (since a does not contain weak nega-
tion). Furthermore, :b1; . . . ;:bk 62 E and E  C0I (this equality is easily checked).
Thus, we have I 6 :b1; . . . ;:bk so I  ÿ  b1; . . . ;ÿ  bk from which it follows that
In; I   ÿ  b1; . . . ;ÿ  bk. We have proved that In; I   Blpd, so lpd 2 Xn.
Conversely, suppose that lpd 2 Xn. If, again, d  a: b1; . . . ; bk=c1 j    j cl, then
In; I   a;ÿ  b1; . . . ;ÿ  bk. It follows that In  a, so a 2 En. As
In; I   ÿ  b1; . . . ;ÿ  bk, we have that I 6 :b1; . . . ;:bk. But then
:b1; . . . ;:bk 62 E, which implies d 2 Dn. 
Now we are ready to state and prove the main result of this section, namely that
the translation lp of disjunctive defaults (with constructively generated extensions)
into logic programming (with stable generated models) is faithful.
Theorem 3. Let D be a (disjunctive) default theory.
1. For every constructively generated extension E of D there is a stable generated
model I of lp (D) such that I  LitE. Furthermore, if Enn<x is the sequence of
Definition 15 leading to E, then Inn<x defined by In  LitEn is an lpD-stable
chain generating I.
2. For every stable generated model I of lp(D) there is a constructively generated ex-
tension E of D such that Lit(E) I. Furthermore, if Inn<x is an lp(D)-stable chain
generating I, then the sequence Enn<x defined by En  C0In is a sequence leading
to E in the sense of Definition 15.
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Proof.
1. Let E be a constructively generated extension of D then there is a sequence
E0  E1      En    , E 
S
i<x Ei satisfying the conditions of Definition
15. Let In  LitEn. We show that Inn<x is a stable chain for lpD generating
I  LitE. Obviously, I0  ;, since LitE0  ;. It is easy to check that En  C0
In so we may apply Lemma 12. Suppose In; I   Blpd, for
d  a: b1; . . . ; bn=c1 j    j cl. Then lpd 2 Xn, so d 2 Dn. As E is a construc-
tively generated extension, ci 2 En1 for some 16 i6 l. But this implies that
LitEn1  ci, so In1  ci, yielding In1 
W
Hlpd. In1 is also minimal with
this property: assume, In  J  In1 and J satisfies the heads of the sequents in
the set Xn1. Then, C0J satisfies the condition ClcgenE, and since En1 is by
assumption minimal, it follows J  In1.
2. Let I be stable generated model of lpD, I  Sn<x In, Inn<x a stable chain.
Let En  C0In; we show that E 
S
n<x En is a constructively generated
extension of D. Obviously, E0  C0;. We have to show: En1 is a minimal
extension of En satisfying the closure condition ClcgenE. Let d 2 D,
d : a: b1; . . . ; bm=c1 j    j cl, a 2 C0En, and :b1; . . . ;:bm 62 E. Using Lemma
12, it is d 2 Dn, so lpD 2 Xn. As I is a stable generated model, In1  ci for
some 16 i6 l. From this one concludes ci 2 C0In1, so ci 2 En1. We finally
show that En1 is a minimal extension. Assume, En  E0  En1, E0 satisfies
ClcgenE. Then it holds In  LitE0  In1. Since Inn<x is a stable chain it
follows LitE0  In1, hence E0  C0LitE0  En1. .
It is not clear whether there exists a natural translation of arbitrary extended logic
programs into default logic with constructively generated extensions; it seems that
this default mechanism is more restricted than extended generalized logic programs.
But, for a special class of extended logic programs this can be done. Let r 
F1; . . . ; Fm;ÿ  G1;ÿ  Gn ) H1; . . . ;Hs be a program rule such that the formulas
Fi;Gj;Hl do not contain weak negation. Programs consisting of rules of this kind
are called in the following extended general disjunctive logic programs. Note that this
is a real restriction because this class does not contain even the set NF EGLP of
normal forms of extended generalized rules. In a sequent in normal form, there
may be weakly negated literals in the head, and in the body, literals from Lit0 and
weakly negated literals may simultaneously occur in one of the conjuncts. In extend-
ed general disjunctive logic programs, both of these possibilities may not occur.
We define the following translation into default logic:
def r  F1 ^    ^ Fm: G1; . . . ;Gn=H1 _    _ Hk
For a set P of program rules of this form let def P  fdef r; r 2 Pg.
Proposition 13. Let P be a normal extended disjunctive logic program and def(P) its
default translation. If the set E of sentences is a constructively generated extension
of def(P) then Lit(E ) is a stable generated model of P. Conversely, for every stable gen-
erated model I of P there is a constructively generated extension E of def(P) such that
Lit(E) I. In both cases, the sequences generating I, respectively E, are pointwise cor-
responding in the sense of Theorem 3.
Proof. From Theorem 3, we know that constructively generated extensions of def P
correspond to the stable generated models of lpdef P . By Lemma 4 we may
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transform lpdef P  F1 ^    ^ Fm;ÿ  G1; . . . ;ÿ  Gn ) H1 _    _ Hk into the
rule F1; . . . ; Fm;ÿ  G1;ÿ  Gn ) H1; . . . ;Hs without changing the stable generated
semantics. But this latter rule is just the original rule r! We have proved that the con-
structively generated extensions of def P  correspond to the stable generated models
of P . 
For any set D of disjunctive defaults, lpD is a extended general disjunctive
logic program with corresponding semantics. But by the above proposition,
def lpD is a set of defaults whose semantics corresponds to lpD. This
means that D and def lpD have the same constructively generated exten-
sions. But they are not the same: a default d  a: b1; . . . bn=c1 j    j cl in D
corresponds to the default a: b1; . . . bn=c1 _    _ cl in def lpD. This means
that for constructively generated extensions disjunctive defaults can be replaced
by defaults of the form given by def lpd. This result should not come as a
surprise, since constructively closed sets must commit to one of the disjuncts in
c1 _    _ cm  consd. Constructively closed extensions for defaults theories are
inherited from stable generated models of logic programs.
9. Conclusion
Generalizing the approach of Ref. [1] we investigated the relations between stable
generated models and minimal partial temporal models. A translation was given
from programs into theories in partial temporal logic, which preserves semantics.
Furthermore, we introduced the notions of (constructively) generated extensions
of a disjunctive default theory and studied embeddings of default theories in logic
programming and vice versa.
This established a close relation between three dierent approaches to non-mono-
tonic reasoning: (disjunctive) default logic, stable generated models of logic pro-
grams and minimal temporal partial models. In all three approaches there is a
notion of generating conclusions starting from scratch, on the basis of the final out-
comes. This connection adds further evidence to the naturalness of stable generated
models as a possible semantics for generalized logic programs.
Acknowledgements
We thank G. Wagner for valuable comments and discussions. Thanks also due to
the anonymous referees for their criticism and useful comments.
References
[1] J. Engelfriet, H. Herre, Generated models and extensions of non-monotonic systems, in: J.
Maluszynski (Ed.), Logic Programming, Proceedings of the 1997 International Symposium, MIT
Press, Cambridge, MA, 1997, pp. 85–99.
[2] J. Engelfriet, Formalization and specification of reasoning processes, Ph.D. Thesis, Vrije Universiteit
Amsterdam, Faculty of Exact Sciences, Amsterdam, 1998, to appear.
24 J. Engelfriet, H. Herre / J. Logic Programming 41 (1999) 1–25
[3] J. Engelfriet, J. Treur, A temporal model theory for default logic. in: M. Clarke, R. Kruse, S. Moral
(Eds.), Proceedings ECSQARU’93, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 747, Springer, Berlin,
1993, pp. 91–96. Extended and revised version appeared as ‘An interpretation of default logic in
minimal temporal epistemic logic’ in: Journal of Logic Language and Information 7 (1998) 369–388.
[4] J. Engelfriet, J. Treur, Temporal theories of reasoning, in: C. MacNish, D. Pearce, L.M. Pereira
(Eds.), Proceedings JELIA’94, Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, vol. 838, Springer, Berlin, 1994,
pp. 279–299; also in: Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 5 (2) (1995) 239–261.
[5] M. Gelfond, V. Lifschitz, The Stable model semantics for logic programming, in: R.A. Kowalski,
K.A. Bowen (Eds.), Proceedings ILPS’88, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1988, pp. 1070–1080.
[6] M. Gelfond, V. Lifschitz, Logic programs with classical negation, in: D. Warren, P. Szeredi (Eds.),
Proceedings ICLP’90, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990, pp. 579–597.
[7] M. Gelfond, V. Lifschitz, Classical negation in logic programs and disjunctive databases, New
Generation Computing 9 (1991) 365–385.
[8] M. Gelfond, V. Lifschitz, H. Przymusinska, M. Truszczynski, Disjunctive defaults, in: J.
Allen, R. Fikes, E. Sandewall, (Eds.), Proceedings KR’91, Morgan Kaufmann, Los Altos, CA,
1991, pp. 230–237.
[9] H. Herre, J. Jaspars, G. Wagner, Partial logics with two kinds of negation as a foundation for
knowledge-based reasoning, Report No. 12, Institut fur Informatik, Universitat Leipzig, 1995; to
appear in: D. Gabbay, H. Wansing (Eds.), What is Negation?, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997.
[10] H. Herre, G. Wagner, Solving practical reasoning problems with extended disjunctive logic
programming, Report No. 8, Institut fur Informatik, Universitat Leipzig, 1996.
[11] H. Herre, G. Wagner, Stable models are generated by a stable chain, Journal of Logic Programming
30 (2) (1997) 165–177.
[12] H. Herre, G. Wagner, Semantics for extended generalized logic programs, Report No. 7, Institut fur
Informatik, Universitat Leipzig, ISSN 1430-3701, 1997.
[13] V. Lifschitz, T.C. Woo, Answer sets in general nonmonotonic reasoning, in: B. Nebel, C. Rich, W.
Swartout (Eds.), Proceedings KR’92, Morgan Kaufmann, Los Altos, CA, 1992, pp. 603–614.
[14] F. Lin, Applications of the situation calculus to formalizing control and strategic information: The
prolog cut operator, in: M.E. Pollack (Ed.), Proceedings of the 15th International Joint Conference
on Artificial Intelligence, Morgan Kaufmann, Los Altos, CA, 1997, pp. 1412–1418.
[15] F. Lin, R. Reiter, Rules as actions: A situation calculus semantics for logic programs, Journal of
Logic Programming 31 (1996) 299–330.
[16] T.C. Przymusinski, Stable semantics for disjunctive programs, New Generation Computing 9 (1991)
401–424.
[17] T.C. Przymusinski, Super logic programs and negation as belief, in: R. Dyckho, H. Herre, P.
Schroeder-Heister (Eds.), Proceedings of the Fifth International Workshop on Extensions of Logic
Programming, Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1050, Springer, Berlin, 1996, pp. 229–236.
[18] R. Reiter, A logic for default reasoning, Artificial Intelligence 13 (1980) 81–132.
[19] R. Reiter, The frame problem in the situation calculus: A simple solution (sometimes) and a
completeness result for goal regression, in: V. Lifschitz (Ed.), Artificial Intelligence and Mathematical
Theory of Computation, Papers in Honor of John McCarthy, Academic Press, New York, 1991, pp.
418–420.
[20] J.C. Shepherdson, Introduction to the Theory of Logic Programming, Proceedings of the Logic Coll.,
1986, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1988.
[21] Subrahmanian, Zaniolo, Relating stable models and AI planning domains, 12th ICLP, 1995.
[22] M.G. Wallace, Tight, consistent and computable completions for unrestricted logic programs,
Journal of Logic Programming 15 (1993) 243–273.
J. Engelfriet, H. Herre / J. Logic Programming 41 (1999) 1–25 25
